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Abstract
Previous cognitive modelling work has suggested that
the decline of short-term memory (STM) capacity is the
dominant factor of age-related decline on recall ability. We
report the results of a set of experiments investigating in
further detail the effect of varying short-term memory ca-
pacity on the recall of chess positions using the CHREST
cognitive architecture, and demonstrate a good qualitative
match for human data. We then use these results to suggest
a potential functional reason for the size of STM capacity in
humans and go on to explore the relationships between STM
capacity, ageing, knowledge, presentation time, and recall
ability.
1 Introduction
Psychology and cognitive science study the workings of
the human mind. Applications include many areas of hu-
man behaviour, both in trying to understand why people
do things in certain ways, as well as trying to predict how
people will react in new situations. The process of simula-
tion and modelling is a challenge in these sciences, as the
phenomena under study (people) are complex, and simple
models typically fail to capture enough properties of the sit-
uation to provide adequate results. Since Newell [20], cog-
nitive scientists have used cognitive architectures to collect
the results from many different concrete simulations into
single explanatory frameworks. The advantage of having a
single architecture is that constructing a specific model in
one area can rely on the results of models from other areas
to constrain their parameters and focus attention on what is
scientifically important.
In this paper, we are interested in what happens to human
memory as a result of ageing, a topic of increasing impor-
tance in a society where people are living and working for
longer. As a focus of our study, we use a popular memory
task from psychology, the recall of chess positions; a par-
ticipant in the experiment is presented with a chess position
for a few seconds, and then must reconstruct the position
from memory. The most complete model of chess expertise
has been constructed in the CHREST (Chunk Hierarchy and
REtrieval STructures) [10, 12] cognitive architecture, and
we use this model to simulate the effects of ageing. In pre-
vious work [24], we repeated an experiment performed by
Charness [3, 4, 5] to explore the interactions between chess
skill, age, and presentation time on recall ability. Charness
found a positive correlation between recall ability and chess
skill. He also found a negative correlation with ageing, and
that this difference between young and old players became
greater as the presentation time increased.
One of the main advantages of using a cognitive model
is that it becomes possible to manipulate the workings of
the mind in a way not possible with human subjects. Con-
sequently, when we repeated the experiment, we explored
the combined qualitative effect of varying each of a set of
six key parameters of CHREST. We found that only one of
the key parameters, namely STM capacity, caused the nec-
essary interaction between age and presentation time when
manipulated.
Computational limitations meant that we were only able
to explore high and low values for each of the parameters
in [24], but with the identification of STM capacity as the
key parameter, we here report our further investigations into
the effect of changing this parameter specifically.
2 Background
The human mind can be considered to have three dif-
ferent types of memory, differentiated by the amount of
time information can remain in that memory, as well as the
source of that information. Sensory memory serves only to
store sensory information from the senses, which is rapidly
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lost unless selected by the attention system. Short-term
memory (STM) is the mind’s working memory; the infor-
mation that one is directly conscious of. Long-term mem-
ory (LTM) is the mind’s persistent information store, and
the information thus stored mostly endures without being
consciously accessed. It is STM with which we are primar-
ily concerned in this paper.
It is still a matter of some debate as to how many forms of
STM exist, and to the extent of their domains and indepen-
dence. One influential model is that proposed by Baddeley
and Hitch [2], in which STM is divided into the visuospa-
tial sketchpad, the phonological loop, the central executive,
and the episodic buffer [1]. It can be shown (through dual-
task experiments) that there is at least a strong degree of
independence between the component of STM that handles
visuo-spatial information and the component that handles
auditory information. In this paper we are primarily con-
cerned with the part of STM that handles visuo-spatial op-
erations (hereafter referred to simply as STM).
It is known that the capacity of STM is quite small. De-
spite some early evidence that human STM was 7±2 [19],
it is now understood that the limited STM capacity can be
masked by the chunking effect [7, 12]. Coltheart [8] found
that subjects could only retain an average of 4.3 items in
STM, and later studies have broadly agreed with this figure;
it is now generally agreed that young adults have a visual
STM of around 4 chunks [9, 18].
It came as some surprise to find that the capacity of STM
was so small, given the complex tasks encompassing many
different pieces of information that humans are capable of
performing. However, as shown by Simon [13, 22, 23], the
human mind is able to act on pieces of information in com-
bination, known as chunks. Chunks are associated pieces of
information that have become familiar, and so collectively
possess some meaning; a good example is how individual
letters become associated as words, which are then stored in
memory. Current research indicates that items in STM are
actually references to the information stored in LTM [12].
It is not presently understood from either an evolution-
ary, or a neurological basis, why the capacity of STM
should be around 4 chunks. What is clear, though, is that
STM capacity does not remain constant. Abilities such as
vision, hearing and memory [21] all decline with increas-
ing age. An important question in the study of ageing is
the extent to which expertise might moderate the effects of
ageing [6]; does increasing knowledge mitigate the loss of
STM capacity? To properly explore this question, we need
a deeper understanding of the relationship between STM
capacity and memory ability. We next introduce CHREST,
the cognitive theory within which we shall explore this re-
lationship.
Figure 1. The main components of CHREST
3 CHREST
CHREST is a computer-based, general-purpose cogni-
tive architecture that incorporates STM, LTM, and percep-
tion/attention systems [12]; see Figure 1. It has previously
been shown to successfully model domains as diverse as
chess expertise [10], physics representation [16], and lan-
guage acquisition [11, 15]; in this paper, we are looking
specifically at its ability to model the perception and mem-
ory of chess positions.
An important goal of CHREST is that it operates un-
der the same constraints as humans do as far as possible.
Specifically, humans take time to perform tasks, and an
important aspect of the experiments in this investigation is
keeping track of this. Consequently, for each operation that
is performed by CHREST that is known to take time by
humans, such as fixating a new square, time equivalent to
the measured (or best estimated) human value is added to
CHREST’s internal clock.
The basic unit of the CHREST memory representation is
the chunk. As described above, a chunk is a familiar pattern
of features; in the case of chess, chunks consist of a subset
of the piece-square combinations in a game position. These
chunks are stored in a LTM structure represented as a dis-
crimination network. CHREST learns chunks through re-
peated exposure to game positions. New chunks that are en-
countered are added to the discrimination network in a pro-
cess called discrimination, and more information is stored
about chunks that are re-encountered in a process called
familiarisation; thus, discrimination increases the number
of chunks potentially recognisable, and familiarisation in-
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creases the amount of detail that can be recalled about each
chunk.
The STM of the model is a set of references to chunks
held in LTM. The STM structure can contain up to a fixed
maximum number of chunks. This maximum is normally
equal to the human STM capacity of around 4, but in this
investigation we look into the effects of varying this figure.
The learning process is directed by the perception system
(see [17] for a recent overview). Simulated eye movements
(approximately corresponding to attention) are carried out
between squares on the board. The primary method of de-
termining the next square to fixate utilises the chunks cur-
rently held in STM. The perception system uses links previ-
ously established between chunks in LTM to attempt to de-
termine if the chunk is (or is not) part of a previously learnt,
more specific chunk. When this strategy is not possible (for
example, when first looking at the board, or with a novice
to the domain with few chunks in LTM), one of a number of
domain-independent heuristics is used, such as “look at the
centre of the board”, or “select a random occupied square”.
As can be seen above, the perception system is both respon-
sible for, and affected by, information in memory, resulting
in complex emergent behaviour.
More information on CHREST is available from:
http://people.brunel.ac.uk/˜hssrrls/chrest/index.php
4 Experiment
The CHREST system was set up as a model of the ex-
pertise of chess players. A set of discrimination networks
were trained to represent the acquired knowledge of chess
players of a range of abilities. The data used to train the
networks were a set of 76,420 chess positions (mostly taken
from Master games after around 20 moves, but with some
earlier game states also included).
Charness’s experiment on position memorisation [5] was
repeated using CHREST to simulate the subjects. In the
original experiment, a group of human subjects were each
presented with a chess position for a short time, and were
then required to attempt to recall the pieces present and their
locations. With CHREST, the system was exposed to a test
position for a length of time as defined by the system’s inter-
nal clock. During this simulated period of time, CHREST
modelled an attempt by a human subject to memorise the
position: eye movements were simulated, as directed by the
contents of STM and heuristics, data were perceived, and
STM was updated with chunks recalled from LTM. After
the allotted time was up, CHREST made an attempt to re-
construct the position using the contents of its memory. The
results of comparing this reconstruction to the original posi-
tion were then collected for evaluation. The dependent vari-
able was the proportion of pieces that CHREST correctly
replaced.
The independent variables were as follows:
• CHREST networks of {100, 1,000, 10,000, 100,000,
200,000, 300,000} nodes were used. 300,000 nodes
represents the estimated number of nodes acquired by
a chess Master [14].
• Presentation times of {1, 2, 4} seconds. These were
the values used by Charness in the human-based exper-
iments; the same values were used in the experiment
for ease of comparison.
• STM Capacity was modified in the range [1, 10]. As
discussed above, it has been shown that young adult
humans have a visual STM capacity of around 4. Pre-
vious modelling with CHREST suggests that STM ca-
pacity decreases with age, whereas older research sug-
gested STM capacity was larger. We have chosen a set
of values to investigate this full range.
For each combination of parameters as described above,
this process was repeated ten times to simulate the ten sub-
jects in the Charness experiment: this meant 1,800 exper-
iments in total. Each simulated subject was tested on 50
separate positions independent of the training data.
5 Results
Figure 2 shows graphs of the interactions between STM
capacity and presentation time by network size.
5.1 General Trends
In general, the results of the experiment show the ex-
pected correlation with the independent variables: recall
tends to improve as the maximum capacity of STM is in-
creased, when the time allocated to the system for inspect-
ing the board is lengthened, and with larger discrimina-
tion networks (simulating increased knowledge). The ex-
planations are straightforward: a larger STM capacity al-
lows for more chunks (and hence more information about
the position) to be stored; a longer presentation time allows
the system to perceive more of the board and spend more
time searching its memory for chunks; and a more compre-
hensive discrimination network makes it more likely that a
chunk relevant to the position will be available.
However, diminishing returns are seen as the values of
the independent variables approach their maxima. As the
STM capacity of the system increases, the selected chunks
cover more of the board, until it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult and/or less likely to find a separate chunk in LTM that
incorporates the uncaptured information. Similarly, as addi-
tional time for inspecting the board is made available to the
system, it becomes increasingly unlikely that further novel
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(a) Network size: 100 (d) Network size: 100,000
(b) Network size: 1,000 (e) Network size: 200,000
(c) Network size: 10,000 (f) Network size: 300,000
Figure 2. Interactions between STM capacity and presentation time, by network size.
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information is perceived from the board, and less likely that
a chunk more specific to the position exists in LTM. As
more chunks are added to the LTM store, the new chunks
that are added are less commonly-occurring and more spe-
cific, so each additional chunk is less likely to be relevant to
any specific position.
There are some specific interactions between the vari-
ables. Increasing the presentation time only improves the
recall accuracy if the system has sufficient resources to take
advantage of the extra time; with a network size of only 100
nodes, there is little improvement when the STM capacity
and/or the presentation time is increased.
5.2 Comparison to Experimental Data
Figure 3 shows the results of the human subjects in the
Charness experiments compared to a subset of the CHREST
results limited to the same approximate parameters of the
human subjects. Chess players of the standard used in the
experiments (class B/C) would be expected to have acquired
between 100 and 1,000 chunks [25]. The STM capacity of
a young adult is around 4 chunks as has been already dis-
cussed; results of the simulations with a lower STM capac-
ity (arbitrarily selected as 3: the human data are not clear)
as would be expected due to ageing are also shown.
As can be seen from Figure 3, CHREST performs less
well than the human subjects in an absolute sense but the
data do match some qualities of the human data. Like hu-
mans, the model displays improved recall accuracy with
longer presentation time, and a smaller increase per second
between 2 and 4 seconds than between 1 and 2 seconds (in-
terestingly, this second feature is only observed when STM
capacity is set between the approximate human norms of 3
and 4). When STM capacity is reduced (believed to be the
dominant factor in age-related degradation in the domain,
as already discussed), absolute accuracy decreases, but the
shape of the plot remains the same again, consistent with
the human results.
6 Discussion
6.1 Accuracy
CHREST has qualitatively reproduced the effects of skill
and STM capacity, but specific models perform less well
than humans of the same estimated skill level. Since
CHREST has previously been shown to accurately repro-
duce human ability to recall chess positions [10], we be-
lieve that the difference in accuracy is due to the different
positions CHREST was tested with (it has been previously
shown [14] that the accuracy of position recall is strongly
dependent on the type of position).
Figure 3. Plot of performance against presen-
tation time
6.2 STM Capacity
One feature of the results is the diminishing returns ob-
tained with a STM capacity of more than 4 chunks. In all
experiments, most of the maximum performance had been
obtained when STM capacity was set to 4. This is most
obvious with an exposure time of 1 second. Accuracy as
a proportion of the maximum accuracy achieved increases
from 0.914 to 0.985 between a STM capacity of 3 and 4.
Thus, we suggest that the capacity of human STM is lim-
ited to around 4 chunks because a larger capacity is not par-
ticularly useful. Natural Selection predicts that traits of lim-
ited value to the organism’s survival will not be preserved
due to genetic drift; also it is likely that extra STM capacity
requires some extra expenditure of energy to maintain.
One significant objection that may be raised against this
hypothesis is the limitations of chess as a domain for such a
general conclusion. Chess is an artificial and limited prob-
lem space, and though a STM of 4 may work well in per-
ceiving the game, it is not clear if these results will gener-
alise. (It may even be the case that chess has become such a
popular game because the perception of the board is so well
matched to human STM). This is certainly a good reason to
be cautious of this interpretation, yet we believe that this is
an intriguing result nevertheless and warrants further study.
6.3 Methodology
As described above, a major advantage of using a cogni-
tive model is that it makes it possible for the cognitive sci-
entist to explore the effects of setting parameters to specific
values. In this experiment we have varied two parameters
of the model: STM capacity, and skill level, and assigned
each of them a fine-grained series of values to investigate
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their effects and interactions. This systematic approach to
exploring the parameters of the model is one we believe to
be valuable, and which we hope to explore in further exper-
iments. We are developing tools to automate this process
and apply these experiments to larger sets of variables.
This experiment is but one part in a project to not only
understand CHREST more fully, but also to obtain a deeper
understanding of the parameters of human minds. Under-
standing the limits of human memory is likely to have impli-
cations beyond the cognitive and social sciences. Humans
still clearly outperform computers in many AI applications,
in spite of a relatively limited ability to process problem-
solving states. A cognitive model of the domain knowledge
acquired by humans will likely be of immense importance
in improving the kinds of problem-solving heuristics which
can be applied to computationally intensive tasks. As the
wider CHREST project continues, we plan to give CHREST
an ability to play chess well whilst retaining the ’limita-
tions’ of human memory, and previous CHREST work sug-
gests that these results will transfer to many other domains.
7 Conclusion
The CHREST cognitive architecture supports the com-
putational simulation of many aspects of human memory.
We have shown that CHREST qualitatively simulates hu-
man performance in recalling chess positions depending on
their skill and STM capacity; the effect of STM capacity is
particularly interesting, as this is believed to be key to un-
derstanding the effect of age on human performance. As
part of a growing body of evidence, this result further sup-
ports the theory of human memory embodied in CHREST,
and further work is aiming to utilise this memory in com-
plex problem-solving tasks.
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